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Identity Thieves Get More than They Bargained for:
Victim's Venue
Nathaniel H. Clark
Code Section Affected
Penal Code § 786 (amended).
SB 612 (Simitian); 2008 STAT. Ch. 47.
As the power and self-confidence of a community increase, the penal law
always becomes more moderate; every weakening or imperiling of the
former brings with it a restorationof the harsherforms of the latter.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Forget flesh-eating zombies; a real horror flick would feature the deceased
opening credit lines six-feet under.2 But modem "grave robber" Tracy June
Kirkland is far from the walking-dead . When federal investigators apprehended
Tracy, she was perfecting the exploitation of on-line genealogy sites by
extracting social security numbers to pilfer the identities of the departed.4
Identity theft is a generally detached crime because eighty-four percent of
perpetrators have no personal relationship with their victims.5 Many incidents go
unprosecuted because they occur in large urban areas where there are a
magnitude of other crimes.6 This geographic disconnect between the impact and
commission of the crime leaves prosecutors in paralysis.7 Authorities in the
victim's jurisdiction are often legally unable to prosecute in that venue. 8
Furthermore, authorities in the jurisdiction of the commission of the crime may
have too many pending cases, or little incentive, to press charges because the

1.

FRILDRICH NIETZSCIIE, GENEALOGY OF MORALS II § 10 (Walter Kaufmaann ed., trans., Random

House 1989) (1887).
2.

See Kevin Poulsen, Feds Charge California Woman with Stealing IDs from the Dead, WIRED, Apr.

17, 2008, http:lIblog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/04/feds-charge-cal.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (reporting the arrest and grand jury indictment of a woman charged with stealing identities of deceased
victims).
3. Id.
4. Indictment at 2, United States v. Kirkland, No. 08-cr-00448-UA (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 15, 2008)
(alleging that defendant used www.rootsweb.com to identify the social security numbers of the deceased for the
purpose of activating credit lines under their names).
5.

SYNOVATE,

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-2006

IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 28 (2007),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/1 I/SynovateFinalReportlDTheft2006.pdf (on file with the McGeorge

Law Review) (official report prepared for the Federal Trade Commission based on nation-wide surey).
6.

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 612, at 4 (June

7.

Id.
Id.

8.

10,

2008).
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citizens they represent have been relatively unaffected by the crime committed
on their own soil.9

With individuals like Tracy robbing the dead from the comfort of their
homes via the Internet, it is easy to see why identity theft is the fastest growing
crime in the country.'
California has been on the forefront of improving identity theft statutes, as
Chapter 47 illustrates." If Tracy's victims were alive today, she could be tried at
the venue of their respective residences-a new precedent in prosecuting identity
thieves.2

II. LEGAL
A.

BACKGROUND

Definitions Under PriorLaw

Section 530.55 of the Penal Code 3 defines "personal information" as "any
name, address, telephone number, health insurance number, taxpayer
identification number, school identification number, state or federal driver's
license, or identification number, social security number, place of employment,"
as well as a litany of other sensitive information.' 4 Section 530.5 prohibits the
willful unlawful use of personal information. 5 Such uses include the
perpetrator's efforts "to obtain, or attempt to obtain credits, goods, services, real
property, or medical information without the consent of that person."' 6 Section
530.5 further prohibits unauthorized acquisition, retention, sale, transference, and

9. See id. (noting that the impact of the crime is often felt in the locality of the victim, where property
concerns must be addressed).
10. Identity Theft Is America's Fastest Growing Crime, http://www.usps.com/postalinspectors/idthft
_ncpw.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that last year alone, over 9.9 million Americans
were victimized at a cost of roughly $5 billion).
11. See Kathleen Hunter, California Law on ID Theft Seen as Model, STATELINE.ORG, Apr. 4, 2005,
http://www.stateline.orgflive/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=136&languageld=I&contentl d=22828 (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review); CAL. PENAL CODE § 786(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 47) (amending code to
include the county where the victim resided at the time of the commission of the offense).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 786(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 47).
13. Absent clarification, all statutory references are to the California Penal Code.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.55(b) (West Supp. 2008). The section goes on to define "information" as:
employee identification number, professional or occupational number, mother's maiden name,
demand deposit account number, savings account number, checking account number, PIN (personal
identification number) or password, alien registration number, government passport number, date of
birth, unique biometric data including fingerprint, facial scan identifiers, voiceprint, retina or iris
image, or other unique physical representation, unique electronic data including information
identification number assigned to the person, address or routing code, telecommunication identifying
information or access device, information contained in a birth or death certificate, or credit card
number of an individual person, or an equivalent form of identification.
Id.
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5(a) (West Supp. 2008).
16. Id.
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conveyance of personal information with the intent to defraud. 7 In the context of
identity theft, "person" is defined as "a natural person, firm, association,
organization, partnership, business trust, company, corporation, limited liability
company, or public entity."' 8
B. Constitutionaland Statutory History
1. Reasonable Relationship or Nexus
Penal Code Section 777's general rule of territorial jurisdiction states that
"except as otherwise provided by law[,] the jurisdiction of every public offense is
in any competent court within the jurisdictional territory of which it is
committed."' 9 However, when the Legislature makes an exception to section 777,
the statute is construed liberally to match the legislative purpose of expanding
criminal jurisdiction.2° In Price v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
held that the Legislature's power to designate venue is limited by the requirement
of a reasonable relationship or nexus between the venue and the commission of
the offense.2'
2.

Venue and Vicinage

The Price court's reasoning concurred with the appellate court's assertion
that the "contemporary right to trial by jury no longer contemplates jurors who
are familiar with the parties and the locality and therefore are able to supply their
own personal knowledge. 22 That feature has been replaced with a right to jury
members who do not have independent knowledge of the incident or parties.23
The court weighed the value and legitimacy of "vicinage" rights, which pertain to
the area from which a jury is drawn and is distinct from, but closely related to,
venue-the location of the trial itself.24 Although venue is a statutory concept and
not a constitutional right,25 the defendant argued that vicinage rights derive from

17. Id. § 530.5(c)-(d).
18. Id. § 530.5(f).
19. Id. § 777.
20. Price v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 1046, 1055, 25 P.3d 618, 623 (2001) (interpreting section 781 of
the California Penal Code as "remedial" and construing the statute to expand criminal jurisdiction beyond
common law standards); People v. Bismillah, 208 Cal. App. 3d 80, 85, 256 Cal. Rptr. 25, 28 (1st Dist. 1989)
(same).
21. Price, 25 Cal. 4th at 1075, 25 P.3d at 636; see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 612, at 4 (June 10, 2008) ("Federal and state courts have ruled that pursuant to
the right of vicinage there must be a reasonable nexus between the crime and the county of trial.").
22. Price, 25 Cal. 4th at 1052, 25 P.3d at 621.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1054-55, 25 P.3d at 623; People v. Guzman, 45 Cal. 3d 915, 934, 755 P.2d 917, 927 (1988).
25. See People v. Sering, 232 Cal. App. 3d 677, 684-86, 283 Cal. Rptr. 507, 511-13 (4th Dist. 1991)
("Locus delicti is the statutory (not constitutional) concept of a right to be tried in the county in which the crime

478
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the U.S. and California Constitutions.16 Consequently, any changes in the venue
statute are further limited to the extent they are circumscribed by vicinage and
due process provisions in the U.S. and California Constitutions.27
3. ConstitutionalBackground
In 1774, the Declarations and Resolves of the First Continental Congress
asserted that the law, beyond the common law of England, entitled the American
colonists to "the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of
the vicinage."' Geographic concerns over vicinage rights originated in prior
centuries when American colonists were frequently hauled across seas to
England to be tried criminally. 9 Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution
eliminated this practice.30 The section states, in part, that "[t]he Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall
be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed."'" The
Constitution did not specify any other geographic requirements beyond state
boundaries until the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, which states that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."32
The California Constitution states that "[tjrial by jury is an inviolate right and
shall be secured to all. 33 Although the California Supreme Court failed to
recognize this as an express vicinage right, the court has repeatedly interpreted
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution to include an implicit vicinage
right.3 Further decisions have found that the Sixth Amendment applies to
California and preserves vicinage rights by guaranteeing defendants of state

was committed.").
26. Price,25 Cal. 4th at 1056, 25 P.3d at 623-24.
27. Id. at 1056, 25 P.3d at 624.
28. Address to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies (Oct. 14, 1774), in 1 J. CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774-1789, at 69 (1904).
29. Price,25 Cal. 4th at 1054-55, 25 P.3d at 623.
30. Id. at 1055, 25 P.3d at 623.
§ 2, cl.3 (emphasis added).
31. U.S. CONST. art. III,
32. Id. amend. VI (emphasis added).
33. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
34. See Price, 25 Cal. 4th at 1071, 25 P.3d at 634 (acknowledging history of recognizing implicit
vicinage rights in article I, section 16 of the California Constitution); People v. Hill, 3 Cal. 4th 959, 984, 839
P.2d 984, 996 (1992) (holding that in California, the common law right to a jury selected from the vicinage or
county is implicit in the California Constitution and that county lines are coterminous with vicinage lines);
People v. Danielson, 3 Cal. 4th 691, 704, 838 P.2d 729, 734 (1992) (recognizing Sixth Amendment federal
vicinage rights to jury selection from county of commission of crime and implicit vicinage rights in California
Constitution); Hernandez v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal. 3d 713, 716, 720, 781 P.2d 547, 549, 551 (1989) (denying
defendant's vicinage petition because jury selection was drawn from county of the commission of the crime,
leaving defendant's Sixth Amendment fights un-violated and further distinguishing that county lines, not
judicial districts, constitute the vicinity).
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criminal prosecution "the right to be tried by an impartial jury comprising a
representative cross-section of, and selected from residents of, the judicial district
where the crime was committed."3 California has historically upheld vicinage
rights to ensure defendants avoid "systematic or intentional exclusion of
cognizable economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical
groups.36 Such precedent dates back to 189l."
Departing from these previous assumptions, the Price court ruled that the
vicinage clause in the Sixth Amendment does not apply to California under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and there is no implicit vicinage right in the California
Constitution. 38 Consequently, under Price, California is not necessarily
allow jury selection from the county where the crime was committed.3 9 bound to
C. Price v. Superior Court
Before Price excluded the Sixth Amendment's vicinage clause, it deemed
that clause unnecessary to uphold the fundamental right to a fair jury trial under
article III of the U.S. Constitution. 40 However, even if the Sixth Amendment's
vicinage clause applied to California, the Price court held it would not require
jury selection from the county where the crime was committed. 4' To reach this
conclusion, the Price court delved the annals of history to discern the intended
definition of "district" in the Sixth Amendment's vicinage clause. 42 The analysis
sought to clarify the fact that the Sixth Amendment specifically calls for jury
selection from the "state and district" where the crime was committed.43 Initial
35. People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, 556, 510 P.2d 705, 712 (1973); see also Danielson, 3 Cal. 4th at 704,
838 P.2d at 734 ("Included in this [Sixth Amendment] guarantee is the right to a trial by a jury residing in the
vicinage, applicable in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment."); People v. Bismillah, 208 Cal. App.
3d 80, 87, 256 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1st dist. 1989) (emphasizing that the district "'must include the area where the
crime was committed' (quoting Jones, 9 Cal. 3d at 554, 510 P.2d at 711) (emphasis added and omitted));
Jones, 9 Cal. 3d at 551, 510 P.2d at 709 (finding it "abundantly clear" that a trial by jury of the district wherein
the crime was committed is an "essential feature of jury trial preserved though changed by the Sixth
Amendment and made binding upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment").
36. Hernandez, 49 Cal. 3d at 716, 781 P.2d at 548.
37. See People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 355-56, 25 P. 481, 483-84 (1891) (holding that article 7 of the
California Constitution contains an implicit vicinage right to jury selection from the county where the crime was
committed). The court found that there was "little doubt" that the common law right to a jury trial is as defined
in Blackstone's commentaries:
"When, therefore, a prisoner on his arraignment has pleaded not guilty, and for his trial hath put
himself upon the country, which country the jury are, the sheriff of the county must return a panel of
jurors, liberos et legales homines, de vicineto; that is, freeholders, without just exception, and of the
visne or neighborhood; which is interpreted to be of the county where the fact is committed."
Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *350) (emphasis in original).
38. Price, 25 Cal. 4th at 1059, 25 P.3d at 626.
39. Id. at 1060. 25 P.3d at 626.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1059-60, 25 P.3d at 626.
43. Id. at 1061, 25 P.3d at 627.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 40

readings of this language may accordingly lead some courts to conclude that
because both geographic indicators were listed, the intention was for jury
selection to be from a more specific proximity than the entire state."
Congress enacted the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 a day before the Bill of
Rights was submitted to Congress for ratification. 4' The Price court concluded
that the concurrence of these doctrines was sufficient contextual evidence
indicating that Congress intended "district" to pertain to the federal judicial
districts then in existence and, accordingly, only in federal cases.4 The federal
judicial district lines drawn by Congress coincided with state borders with the
exceptions of Massachusetts and Virginia, which were split into two separate
judicial districts.4 ' The Act only mandates jury selection from the county of the
commission of the offense for capital crimes." Finding no persuasive holdings in
either federal or state trials addressing the incorporation of the Sixth
Amendment's vicinage clause, the Price court concluded that there is no
constitutional vicinage right to a jury trial in the county of the commission of the
crime.49
D. Federal Court Treatment

The United States Supreme Court has never held that the Sixth Amendment's
vicinage clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and has
never defined the word "district" explicitly. 0 However, some federal circuits
have held that the term "district," as used in the Sixth Amendment, pertains only
to federal judicial districts." Although the Ninth Circuit has declined to address
whether the Sixth Amendment's vicinage clause is incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment, other federal circuits have concluded that it is not.52 Ultimately,
only those aspects of the Sixth Amendment essential to preserving fair jury trials

44. Id. at 1062, 25 P.3d at 627-28.
45. Id. at 1061, 25 P.3d at 627.
46. Id. at 1061-62, 25 P.3d at 627; Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (there were to be
thirteen judicial districts for the eleven colonial states: two in both Massachusetts and Virginia).
47. Price, 25 Cal. 4th at 1061, 25 P.3d at 627.
48. See Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 88 § 29; Price,25 Cal. 4th at 1062, 25 P.3d at 628.
49. Price, 25 Cal. 4th at 1059, 1068, 1075, 25 P.3d at 626, 632, 636 (holding that the California
Legislature's power to designate location of trial is limited only by the requirement that there be a reasonable
relationship or nexus between the place designated for trial and the commission of the offense).
50. Hall v. McKee, No. 1:05-cv-142, 2008 WL 1808810 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2008); see also
Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[TIhe Supreme Court has not decided whether the
Sixth Amendment's vicinage clause applies to the states."). But see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 96 (1970)
(indicating that Congress has the power to define vicinage through the creation ofjudicial districts).
51. See, e.g., Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344, 346 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that "district" pertains only to
federal judicial districts); Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 325 (3rd Cir. 1980) (same).
52. Stevenson, 384 F.3d at 1072 (declining to answer incorporation issue); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d
593, 595 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend the Sixth Amendment
vicinage clause to the states); Zicarelli, 633 F.2d at 325-26.
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under article III extend to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.53
III. CHAPTER 47
Chapter 47 amends the jurisdictional provisions of section 786 to include the
crimes of unauthorized retention or transfer of personal information as defined in
section 530.55, and provides that a criminal action for these crimes may be
brought in the
county of the victim's residence at the time of the commission of
54
the offense.
Upon filing such a criminal action in the county where the victim resided at
the time of the commission of the offense, the court or defendant shall file a
motion for a hearing to determine whether such venue is proper.5" In deciding the
issue, the court shall consider the rights of the parties, access to evidence,
convenience to witnesses, and the interests of justice.56
IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 47

A. Chapter47.: Within the Confines of Price?
Chapter 47 represents the limits of the Legislature's power to designate
venue conferred by the Price holding.57 Defendants charged under Chapter 47
will now be tried in the victim's venue; potentially far away from the locality of
the commission of the offense. This standard yields the possibility of criminal
proceedings in counties never before traversed, seen, or contemplated by
defendants. 9 Unlike prior statutes, Chapter 47 does not require that defendants
53.

See generally Williams, 399 U.S. 78 (holding that Florida's notice-of-alibi rule did not deprive

defendant of a fair trial or due process). But see Adamson v. State of California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black,

J., dissenting) ("I fear to see the consequences of the Court's practice of substituting its own concepts of
decency and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as its point of departure in interpreting
and enforcing that Bill of Rights.... I would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment-to extend to all the people of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights.").
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 786(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 47).
55.
56.
57.

Id. § 786(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 47).
Id.
See Price v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 1046, 1075, 25 P.3d 618, 636 (2001) ("The Legislature's

power to designate the place for trial of a criminal offense is limited by the requirement that there be a
reasonable relationship or nexus between the place and the commission of the offense."); ASSEMBLY
COMMI'TEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 612, at 5-6 (June 10, 2008) (discussing the
jurisdictional recommendations of the L.A. District Attorney's Office and the California Public Defender's
Association Office).
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 786(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 47).
59. Id.; ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 612, at 6 (June 10,
2008) (noting that the California Public Defender's Association Office (CPDA) opposes the jurisdictional
provisions of Chapter 47 because potentially innocent defendants will be forced to travel long distances and
entered into custody). The CPDA further argues that trials should be at least limited to where the victim resided
at the time of the commission of the offense, a reasonable waiver of venue rights. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 612, at 6 (June 10, 2008).
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commit actions requisite for accomplishing the offense in the county of such
proceedingsi0
The entirety of the California case history cited in Price, and the fact pattern
of Price itself, demonstrate that in all of those decisions, the defendant had, at the
very minimum, partially committed at least one of the charged crimes in the
county in which the defendant was tried. 6' The Price court cites many California
statutes as examples of the Legislature permitting proceedings outside of the
county where the crime was committed. 62 But with the exception of the treason
statute,63 they all require either that the defendant be apprehended in, or at least
partially consummated the illegal act in, the jurisdictional territory where he or
she is tried. 64 Yet even the treason statute is distinguishable because it only
pertains to acts committed outside of California. 65
6
Chapter 47 goes farther than any of the venue statutes exemplified in Price.
It is the only statute that does not, at a minimum, require that the defendant be
apprehended in, or commit at least part of the offense in, the county of the venue
of the trial.67 Chapter 47 stretches the boundaries of the reasonable relationship or
nexus standard of the Price holding because it challenges prior assumptions of
defendant rightsi6 But under the Price holding, Chapter 47 is a valid use of the
Legislature's power to designate venue. 69

60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 786(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 47).
61. See Price, 25 Cal. 4th at 1055, 1075, 25 P.3d at 623 (citing numerous cases in which defendant at
least partially committed the crime in the county where he was tried); Hernandez v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal. 3d
713, 715-16, 781 P.2d 547, 548 (1989) (holding vicinage lines coterminous with county lines); People v. Jones,
9 Cal. 3d 546, 551, 510 P.2d 705, 709 (1973) (trying defendant in different police precinct, but same county, as
commission of crime); People v. Prather, 134 Cal. 386, 389-90, 66 P. 483 (1901) (where defendant transported
stolen goods from one county to another); People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 25 P. 481 (1891) (holding that the jury
must be selected from county where crime was committed); People v. Bismillah, 208 Cal. App. 3d 80, 86-87,
256 Cal. Rptr. 25, 28-29 (1st Dist. 1989) (noting that although the assault was committed entirely in Alameda
County, the court found ample acts in San Francisco to justify prosecution for the assault).
62. Price, 25 Cal. 4th at 1075, 25 P.3d at 636.
63. See CAL. PENAl. CODE § 788 (providing jurisdiction for criminal action of treason when the overt act
is committed out of state in any county within California). Cf. id. § 790 (providing jurisdiction for murder and
manslaughter in the county where the fatal injury was inflicted, the victim dies, or body is found).
64. Price, 25 Cal. 4th at 1075, 25 P.3d at 636; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 784.7(a) (providing
jurisdiction in any territory where at least one enumerated offense committed); id. § 777(a) (providing
jurisdiction for failure to provide charges in jurisdictional territory where minor child is cared for or where
parent is apprehended); id. § 777(b) (providing jurisdiction for perjury committed outside of state in any
competent court within jurisdictional territory where acts necessary for commission occurred); id. § 778
(providing jurisdiction for public offenses committed through an agent by an out of state defendant in
jurisdictional territory where agent committed acts); id. § 778 (where defendant partially commits act in more
than one territory, jurisdiction is appropriate in any such territory); id. § 784.5 (child abduction cases triable in
county where victim or custodial agency resided at the time of abduction, or where child is taken or found).
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 788.
66. See supra note 64.
67. See id.
68. See generally Price, 25 Cal. 4th at 1055, 1075, 25 P.3d at 623 (citing numerous cases in which
defendant at least partially committed the crime in the county where he was tried).
69. See id. at 1075, 25 P.3d at 636 (requiring a reasonable relationship or nexus).
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B. Victim's Justice versus Innocent Defendant's Jury Rights
The detached nature of identity theft makes the jurisdictional provisions of
Chapter 47 very appealing to prosecutors.' Why should the perpetrator, who is
intentionally creating great hardship for the victim, benefit from antiquated venue
laws that fail to address the exploitation of modem technology? 7' The Internet
permits much abuse by the malicious and savvy user-and
allows such users to
• 71
touch the lives of individuals irrespective of location. It is unjust to allow
perpetrators to escape the presentation of the most effective evidence: the
victim's testimony-which is easier for prosecutor's to obtain in the victim's
venue. 3 What is a mere "click of the mouse" for the perpetrator severely burdens
the victim in efforts to restore his or her shattered credit or reputation. 4
But by enacting Chapter 47, does the Legislature lack peripheral vision in
attempting to eliminate such a disparity? The presumption of innocence, a
fundamental aspect of criminal proceedings, is preempted by the law because the
burden of travel is automatically fixed upon the defendant before the prosecution
proves any culpability. Under Chapter 47, an innocent defendant incurs similar
hardships to those eliminated for victims of identity theft: an unreasonable
burden if required to attend trial hundreds of miles away.76
V. CONCLUSION

Identity theft is a crime that exploits the power of communication
technology," but Chapter 47 mitigates this advantage."' The Penal Code must

70.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 786(b)(1).

71. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 612, at 4 (June 10,
2008) ("The impact of the crime is often felt at the victim's residence, where credit card electronic theft,
pretexting, or other theft of intangible property must be addressed. This bill would allow local prosecutors to
help local victims.").
72. Id. at 5 (noting that the crimes addressed by S 612 are commonly committed over computer
transactions).
73. See id. at 6 ("SB 612 allows local prosecutors the opportunity to bring charges in a county with
better access to the victim and important evidence.").
74. Id. at 4.
75. See CAL. PENAL. CODE § 786(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 47) (enabling judiciary discretion to
permit trial at the venue of the victim).
76. Id.
77. See Indictment at 2, United States v. Kirkland, No. 08-cr-00448-UA (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 15, 2008)
(alleging that defendant used www.rootsweb.com to identify the social security numbers of the deceased for the
purpose of activating credit lines under their names).
78. See CAL.. PENAL CODE § 7861bl(3) (amended by Chapter 47) (enabling judiciary discretion to permit
trial at the venue of the victim). On-line hacking and phishing clearly enables the savvy identity thief to exploit
victims far away from his or her own locality making prosecution unlikely. By allowing prosecutorial
flexibility, Chapter 47 mitigates this geographic advantage. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 612, at 6 (June 10, 2008) (discussing the need to expand prosecutorial reach).
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adapt to match the clever, ever-evolving mind of the modern criminal. 9 Chapter
47 reduces identity thieves' incentive to choose detached and distant victims, a
choice that is all too simple in the Internet age.8° Prior to Chapter 47's enactment,
the larcenist's wise decision was to select victims in far away counties, thereby
lowering the chances of prosecution." But now identity pilferers will get more
than they bargained for: the victim's venue. "2 The law empowers prosecutors
across California to defend their jurisdictions from previously illusive and remote
criminals. "3 But Chapter 47 challenges defendant venue rights more aggressively
than any of the prior statutes cited in the Price decision-the primary legal basis
cited by the Legislature."
Chapter 47 is a powerful yet blunt tool. When incorrectly accused, innocent
defendants may incur the burden of traveling hundreds of miles across one of the
largest states in the country-placing life on hold for trial."5 Identity theft
beckons a response from the Legislature, but a harsher Penal Code reflects a
weaker society-we must act carefully when editing ancient precedent to
accommodate modern crime. 6

79.

Indictment at 2, United States v. Kirkland, No. 08-cr-00448-UA (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 15, 2008); see

also IDENTITY THEFT TECH. COUNCIL, ONLINE IDENTITY THEFT: PHISHING TECHNOLOGY, CHOKEPOINTS AND
COUNTERMEASURES 6 (Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.antiphishing.org/Phishing-dhs-report.pdf (on file

with the McGeorge Law Review) (defining phishing as "online identity theft in which confidential information
is obtained from an individual" with deceptive means. The report estimates phishing related losses to US banks
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